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It is a great pleasure to be on a panel honoring a colleague
who is a distinguished professor of law in reality as well as in title.
I have been looking forward to meeting Bob Leflar ever since I
first heard of him in a roundabout way thirteen years ago. One
of my students brought his rookie professor a clipping from Time
magazine about a New Hampshire conflicts decision, a true rarity
considering the attention the news media pay our discipline. In
that case, Clark v. Clark,I the New Hampshire Supreme Court
had refused to apply the Vermont Guest Act on the grounds that
the statute was a "drag on the coattails of civilization."' 2 Although
I had just retired from practice, I still was not broken of the habit
of judging law by practical standards, and it occurred to me that
the decision made more sense than some of those I had been
teaching. Upon reading the full report of Clark v. Clark, I noticed
that its author, Chief Justice Kenison, relied heavily on Leflar's
writing, which I thought was a fitting tribute by one fine legal
mind to another.-
New Hampshire was the first but not the last state to follow
Leflar's teachings. Clark, apart from putting the conflicts law of
New Hampshire on the right track, encouraged several other
courts to opt for his choice-influencing considerations, among
them the Supreme Court of Minnesota,3 represented this evening
by the Honorable John Todd who wrote the opinion in Milkovich
v. Saari.4
One further extraterritorial effect of Clark, though docu-
mented,5 is less well known. Chief Justice Kenison's scathing
* Professor of Law, Oniversity of California at Davis.
1. 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966).
2. Id. at 355, 222 A.2d at 209. The court apparently borrowed this colorful expression
from Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 CoLuM. L. REV. 959,980 (1952),
but ascribed it to Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 HARv. L. Rv.
1210, 1216 (1946).
3. See Myers v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 302 Minn. 359, 225 N.W.2d 238
(1974); Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973).
4. 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973).
5. See 6 TRIAL 5 (April/May 1970); Juenger, Letter to the Editors, 118 U. PA. L. REv.
1141 (1970); Leflar, Appellate Judicial Innovation, 27 OKLA. L. REv. 321, 341 n.81 (1974).
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remarks about the Vermont Guest Act helped induce the legisla-
ture of the Green Mountain State to repeal the statute, demon-
strating that conflicts can serve as a vehicle for law reform not
only at home but abroad, or at least next door. In fact, this exam-
ple is probably not the only one for the benign propensities inher-
ent in the choice-of-law process.6
Of course, it may not mean that much for a teacher to shape
judicial action in what is, as Professor Herma Hill Kay has put
it, "a field, not of laws, but of men."7 A glance at any of the many
overwritten and richly footnoted opinions amply confirms the
continued validity of her observation. Reading these quasi-law
review pieces, one senses that academicians are the true oracles
of conflicts law.8 There are good oracles and bad oracles, however,
6. New York may have rendered a similar service to Ontario. Until Neumeier v.
Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972), the New York courts
fairly consistently refused to apply that province's Guest Statute, which barred the pas-
senger's action even if the driver's conduct was grossly negligent. See Macey v. Rozbicki,
18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1966); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d
473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963); Bray v. Cox, 39 App. Div. 2d 299, 333
N.Y.S.2d 783 (1972); Kell v. Henderson, 26 App. Div. 2d 595, 270 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1966).
But see Arbuthnot v. Allbright, 35 App. Div. 2d 315, 316 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1970). Perhaps
some members of the provincial legislature had become aware of the treatment that law
was accorded south of the border. This fact might explain why Ontario decided to substi-
tute for its most peculiar enactment a somewhat lesser "drag on the coattails of civiliza-
tion." By the time Neumeier was decided, section 132(3) of the Ontario Highway Traffic
Act, ONT. REV. STAT. 1960, ch. 172, § 105, as amended by ONT. REv. STAT. 1966, ch. 64, §
20(2), did provide for liability in the event that the injury was caused by the driver's gross
negligence. The amendment may in turn have inspired the New York Court of Appeals
for once to apply the provincial Guest Statute.
If one can assume that legislators ever care how their enactments fare in foreign
courts, New York might also be able to claim credit for civilizing the wrongful-death
legislation of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. In Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,
9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961), the court of appeals refused to
honor the Massachusetts statutory limitation on wrongful-death recovery, which at the
time amounted to $15,000 per death. In Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877,
290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968), the court declined to give effect to Maine's more generous ceiling
of $20,000 (which, by the time the matter reached the court, had been repealed). Both
opinions call such arbitrary limitations "absurd and unjust." Kilberg v. Northeast Air-
lines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d at 40, 172 N.E.2d at 528, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 136; Miller v. Miller, 22
N.Y.2d at 18, 237 N.E.2d at 880, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 739. See also Rosenthal v. Warren, 475
F,2d 438 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973). Perhaps it was at least partially in
response to this criticism that Massachusetts first successively increased and then re-
pealed the ceiling on wrongful-death recovery. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 229, § 2 and
Comment-1973 (West Supp. 1979).
7. Kay, Ehrenzweig's Proper Law and Proper Forum, 18 OKLA. L. REv. 233, 233
(1965).
8. At least in part, the reasons for the preeminence accorded to scholaily opinion may
be rooted in history. In the conflict of laws the judges never enjoyed the monopoly position
2
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and I consider Leflar a good one. I keep his American Conflicts
Law,9 now in its third edition, within easy reach for frequent and
fruitful consultation. I faithfully read his Annual Surveys,,' an
enterprise I hope he will not relinquish, as has been rumored, to
student writers and editors. While I should be the last one to
impugn their diligence and intelligence (in fact, one of the best
conflicts articles I have read was written by Professor Westen
when he was still in law school"), I fear that it may prove difficult
to emulate the present surveyor's incisive mind, mature judg-
ment, and lucid style. Let us hope that whoever may succeed him
will at least share Leflar's aversion to what a Canadian observer
called the "penchant for esoteric neologism"' 2 that infests current
conflicts writing.
I trust that few of those gathered here this evening would
take issue with the proposition that Leflar is one of the truly great
law teachers of our times. I wonder, however, whether many of
you share my reasons for holding him in such high esteem.
Clearly, his teachings, have not met with universal acceptance.
Clark v. Clark, for instance, did not prompt all of the workers in
the vineyard to drop their tools for a standing ovation. In fact,
Hans Baade once called the comparison of the merits of compet-
ing substantive- rules in making choice-of-law decisions
"Kafkaesque."' 3 Even at the risk of stirring up controversy, I
would like to state briefly what I perceive to be our honoree's two
of "depositaries of the laws; the living oracles." 1 W. BLACKSTONE, CoMMErAuEs ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 69 (1765). Neither in England nor in the United States did the judiciary
pretend to distill choice-of-law rules from ancient customs; both countries experienced a
"reception . . . of continental maxims." J. WESTLAKE, A TREATISE IN PRvATE INTrNA-
TIONAL LAw 10 (6th ed. 1922). The founding father of American conflicts law readily
acknowledged his indebtedness to European writers, though he noted that "[t]heir works
.. . abound with theoretical distinctions, which serve little other purpose than to provoke
idle discussions, and with metaphysical subtilties *hich perplex, if they do not confound,
the inquirer." J. STORY, COMMENTARMs ON TM CONFLICTS OF LAws 10 (7th ed. 1872). Given
the increasing importance of "secondary authority" in general, see Leflar, Sources of
Judge-Made Law, 24 OKLA. L. REv. 319, 323 (1971), the continued judicial deference to
academic conflicts writing is hardly surprising.
9. R. LEFLAR, AMRmcAN CoNFLICTs LAW (3d ed. 1977).
10. E.g., Leflar, Conflict of Laws, in 1979 ANN. SuRVEy AM. L. 1.
11. Note, False Conflicts, 55 CALIn. L. REv. 74 (1967).
12. Smith, Book Review, 23 AM. J. Comr'. L. 763 (1975).
13. Baade, The Case of the Disinterested Two States: Neumeier v. Kuehner, 1
HoFsTPrA L. Ray. 150, 166 (1973). See also Baade, Counter-Revolution or Alliance for
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most important contributions, if only to have him set me right.
The first of these contributions is a negative one, namely his
stand against the themes that preoccupy contemporary scholar-
ship. I refer to the two recurring fashions in conflicts law, one of
which calls for the resolution of all multistate problems by local-
izing legal relationships, and the other for divining the spatial
dimension of substantive rules. These ideologies, equally implau-
sible, have shown a truly amazing resilience, condemning each
new generation of conflicts scholars to repeat history. The
thought that it is possible to locate the "seat" or "center of grav-
ity" of a tort or a contract dates back at least to Savigny;'4 the
idea that it is possible to discover the territorial reach of rules by
recourse to the processes of construction and interpretation first
appeared in medieval literature.' 5 Parading in the modern garb
of obscurantist terminology, however, these notions still cast a
spell to which even our reputedly pragmatic judiciary seems to
have succumbed.
Mildly but firmly Leflar has pointed out the structural in-
firmities he perceives in the modern conflicts edifices that have
been erected on the shaky old foundations. About the most-
significant-relationship approach he remarked:
It ... lacks an exactly defined content .... The components
of gravity, for the test's purposes, could be changed from case
to case. That may be the formula's chief virtue, but it is at the
same time its weakness. The formula by itself affords no real
basis for decision in the hard cases because it does not identify
the considerations which move courts .... 16
About the school that would derive solutions to multistate prob-
lems from an interpretation of conflicting substantive rules he
had this to say:
The term "governmental interest" does not and cannot include
within itself all the considerations that ought to be taken into
account in the choice-of-law process. Especially when forum
14. See 8 F. VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN R6MIscHEN REcHTs 108 (1849).
According to Savigny, "the whole problem [of choice of law] comes to be-To dis-
cover for every legal relation ... that legal territory to which, in its proper nature, it
belongs or is subject (in which it has its seat)." F. VON SAVIGNY, A TREATISE ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 133 (2d ed. W. Guthrie trans. 1880) (emphasis in original).
15. See Juenger, Lessons Comparison Might Teach, 23 AM. J. CoMP. L. 742, 744-45
(1975) (with further references).
16. R. LEFLAR, supra note 9, at 184-85 (3d ed. 1977).
416 [Vol. 31
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preference is added as a dilemma-escape device, it leaves out
the traditionally important demand for predictability of re-
sults (uniformity regardless of forum) which is urgent for some
types of transactions, it leaves out that regard for interstate
and international orderliness which is as important in an organi-
zation of federated states as it is between nations, and it leaves
out almost all concern for the functions of law in society gener-
ally .... 1
Others, equally critical, have been less moderate and restrained.
Thus, Currie commented on the most-significant-relationship
approach as follows: "The 'contacts' are totted up and a highly
subjective fiat is issued to the effect that one group of contacts
or the other is the more significant. The reasons for the conclusion
are too elusive for objective evaluation.' 8 Yntema, in turn, char-
acterized the calculus of governmental interests as "a vague and
perverse idea, suggesting that laws are made for bureaucracy."'"
In contrast to these acerbic critics, Leflar manages to view
the present conflicts scenery with serenity, detachment, and even
optimism. His most recent article likens the vista to a "well-
watered plateau high above the sinkhole it once occupied,"2I and
he professes only mild amusement about the efforts of academic
writers to stir "the ashes of recent controversy."'" His charity also
extends to the judiciary. In fact, he seems quite pleased with the
new eclecticism reigning in the courts, where judges "fumble"
and "lump" 22 together the discordant themes of current conflicts
methodology. Even his complaint about the formidable bulk of
conflicts writing takes a fairly moderate form: he simply puts
"literature" in quotation marks.2
However understated his criticism, Leflar does not hide his
views. He has made it quite clear what he thinks about such
current fashions as the discriminatory treatment of nonresi-
17. Id. at 186.
18. Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of
Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1212, 1233 (1963).
19. Yntema, Basic Issues in Conflicts Law, 12 AM. J. CoMP. L. 474, 482 (1963).
Yntema was equally critical of the seat-of-the-relationship idea. To him the "supposition
that it is necessary to locate invisible entities" was "bizarre." Yntema, The Historic Bases
of Private International Law, 2 AM. J. CoMP. L. 297, 311 (1953).
20. Leflar, Choice of Law: A Well-Watered Plateau, 41 LAw & CONTrEMP. PROB. 10,
26 (Spring 1977).
21. Id. at 10.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 11.
19801
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dents," the balkanization of conflicts law,25 and the recourse to
cover-up devices." With all due allowance for overburdened ap-
pellate judges who cannot conceivably cope with the never-
ending stream of published material, 2 he censures in no uncer-
tain terms what he considers a peculiarly ethnocentric New York
brand of conflicts jurisprudence, 28 a phenomenon that would in-
deed be strangely out of place in a self-proclaimed "international
clearing house and market place.
'2
Leflar has been equally outspoken against the kind of paro-
chialism that elevates any local rule, even one that at best ex-
presses "minor morals of expediency" or "debatable questions of
internal policy,"3 to the status of a governmental policy demand-
ing vindication at the expense of saner and more decent princi-
ples imported from abroad.'
I come to Leflar's second contribution, namely his insistence
that comparison of the intrinsic merits of conflicting rules should
play a role in the adjudication of multistate transactions. He
apparently likes the "modern" approaches because all of them
permit a court, up to a point, to do justice by preferring, as
24. Id. at 19-21.
25. R. LEFLAR, supra note 9, at 207-08, 210-12.
26. Leflar, supra note 20, at 26.
27. Id. at 11.
28. Id. at 19-20.
29. Intercontinental Planning, Ltd. v. Daystrom, Inc., 24 N.Y.2d 372, 384,248 N.E.2d
576, 583, 300 N.Y.S.2d 817, 827 (1969).
One might, however, question Leflar's assessment of New York conflicts justice. As
regards the New York federal courts, Judge Oakes' opinion in Rosenthal v. Warren, 475
F.2d 438 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973), may not have been inspired so much
by the "self-centered nature of the New York position," Leflar, supra note 20, at 20, than
by the perceived superiority of forum law. See 475 F.2d at 445-46 (Massachusetts limita-
tion on wrongful-death recovery considered "absurd and unjust"). It seems reasonably
clear that the court did not mean to accord a privilege to New Yorkers. Thus, the majority
opinion suggests that, in the converse situation of a Massachusetts victim perishing in a
New York hospital under the scalpel of a New York surgeon, the Massachusetts limitation
on wrongful-death recovery would be equally inapplicable. See 475 F.2d at 445 n.8. Such
an alternative reference to the sounder rule of law should delight Professor Leflar. See also
Rosenthal v. Warren, 374 F. Supp. 522, 524-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
Secondly, it may no longer be accurate to count New York among the states that have
"moved away from lex loci delicti and similar old rules." Leflar, supra note 20, at 21. See
Cousins v. Instrument Flyers, Inc., 44 N.Y.2d 698, 376 N.E.2d 914, 405 N.Y.S.2d 441
(1978); Towley v. King Arthur Rings, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 129, 351 N.E.2d 728, 386 N.Y.S.2d
80 (1976); notes 46-49 infra and accompanying text.
30. Beach, Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Vested Rights, 27 YALE L.J. 656, 662
(1918).
31. See R. LEFLAR, supra note 9, at 210-12.
6
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between conflicting rules, the one that makes more sense.32 This
is of course particularly true of governmental interest analysis.
That approach is characterized by a powerful homing trend that,
in 99 out of 100 cases, leads to the application of forum law.
Though it may seem strange, such blatant jingoism often pro-
duces commonsensical results. A particularly striking illustration
of this propensity is Hurtado v, Superior Court. 3 In Hurtado the
California Supreme Court first disclaimed any interest in the
welfare of Mexican plaintiffs whose breadwinner was killed, as
every conflicts buff will recall, in a California car accident.34 The
court then proceeded, however, to present the widow and orphans
with a much more generous recovery than the pittance authorized
by the law of Zacatecas, their home state.3 5 One may well doubt
whether Hurtado is likely to further the asserted policy to pro-
mote safe driving on the California highways, but it clearly does
enhance the protection of interstate accident victims.
The reason why an analysis ostensibly geared to sovereignty
has such benign effects is easy enough to grasp: adroit forum-
shopping assures that litigation will be conducted in a jurisdic-
tion whose law favors the plaintiff.36 So far so good, but Leflar
would ask, what of judicial candor?7 Although he seems quite
sanguine about the current eclecticism, I am not so sure he really
does condone relegating conflicts theory to the status it seems to
have attained in practice, i.e., to serve as a convenient source for
elaborate verbal justifications needed to buttress foregone conclu-
sions, or worse yet, as a smokescreen camouflaging the primitive
32. See generally Juenger, Choice of Law in Interstate Torts, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 202,
222-28 (1969).
33. 11 Cal. 3d 574, 522 P.2d 666, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1974).
34. Id. at 583, 522 P.2d at 672, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 112.
35. See id. at 578 n.1, 522 P.2d at 668 n.1, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 108 n.1.
36. Not invariably, of course. Even experienced counsel with full awareness of the
advantages offered by a choice of courts may lack the acumen or inclination to sue abroad.
At least according to Cavers, attorneys are more willing and able to cross the courthouse
square than to forum-shop across state lines. Cavers, Change in Choice-of-Law Thinking
and its Bearing on the Klaxon Problem, AL STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JUmSDICTION
BErwEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 154, 159 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1963).
The current unsettled state of conflicts law poses an intriguing question: Should inept
forum-shopping, or failure to forum shop, render counsel liable for malpractice? For a
suggestion to this effect by Dean Griswold, see D. CAvEas, THE CHOICE-oF-LAw PROCESS
20, 22-23 (1965).
37. See Leflar, supra note 20, at 26. See also R. LEFLAR, INTERNAL OPERATING PROCE-
DURES OF APPELLATE COURTS 131 (1976).
1980]
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desire to avoid foreign-law issues.38 Such subterfuge does not
come cheap. The cost is not only a loss of intellectual integrity
in appellate opinions but also uncertainty that inevitably pro-
duces confusion in the lower courts, the federal bench, and the
bar. 9 "Fumbling" and "lumping" will not always do the trick, in
particular where the various modern conflicts approaches point
in different directions." Ultimately, the moment of truth arrives,
at which a court must choose between candor and resignation.
The New York Court of Appeals, the first state court to em-
bark on the conflicts revolution, had to learn this lesson the hard
way. In Babcock v. Jackson41 it cheerfully embraced almost all of
the theories proffered by academicians, including Ehrenzweig's
lex stabuli. 42 As Currie remarked about the court's lumping tech-
nique, "the majority opinion contains items of comfort for almost
every critic of the traditional system."43 At that time Leflar accu-
rately, although somewhat understatedly, predicted that "[t]he
new rule fits these facts perfectly but, as more complex cases
arise, a great deal of ingenuity will be required to adapt it to
them. Undoubtedly the results will vary with the courts and with
the facts."44 What actually happened, as new fact situations came
before the court, was that it "hopped frenetically from theory to
theory like an overheated jumping bean."45 It is no wonder that
the erstwhile forefront of the conflicts revolution was left in disar-
ray. Apparently, by now the New York Court of Appeals, "so
bedeviled by opposing academic theories"" has chosen resigna-
tion. Its latest opinion in Cousins v. Instrument Flyers, Inc.47
states that "lex loci delicti remains the general rule in tort cases
38. Occasionally, however, courts candidly concede this motivation. See In re Paris
Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
39. Sometimes even state supreme courts get confused. For judicial reaction to the
"conflicts maze," see Erwin v. Thomas, 264 Ore. 454, 506 P.2d 494 (1973).
40. See, e.g., Draper v. Airco, Inc., 580 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1978); Melville v. American
Home Assurance Co., 443 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1977), rev'd, 584 F.2d 1306 (3d Cir.
1978).
41. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
42. See Ehrenzweig, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 CoLuln. L. REv. 1212, 1243,
1246-47 (1963).
43. Id. at 1233-34.
44. Id. at 1247.
45. Currie, Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 551, 595, 605 (1968).
46. Leflar, supra note 20, at 11. See Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 130, 286
N.E.2d 454, 459, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64, 72 (1972) (Breitel, C.J., concurring).
47. 44 N.Y.2d 698, 376 N.E.2d 914, 405 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1978).
[Vol. 31
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to be displaced only in extraordinary circumstances. . ... ,8 Per-
haps the best one can say about Cousins is that the court has
finally learned to spell the Latin phrase. 9
The frustrating but instructive New York experience demon-
strates the importance of intellectual honesty. There can be little
doubt that most of the earlier conflicts decisions of the New York
Court of Appeals, from Babcock until Tooker v. Lopez,'" were
strongly result-oriented. Much confusion could have been
avoided if the court had been frank instead of hiding its true
reasons behind doctrinal facades that crumbled as soon as a new
fact pattern compelled reconsideration. Jurisdictions that, like
New Hampshire and Minnesota, adopted Leflar's choice-
influencing considerations, have had fewer problems. California
as well seems to be on the right track. That state has adopted
interest analysis as modified by a wondrous "comparative im-
pairment" doctrine, 5 which is said to preclude any inquiry into
the quality of conflicting policies. 2 Still, the California Supreme
Court, in Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 53 recently
permitted a "prevalent and progressive" foreign law to override
what it believed to be an "unusual and outmoded" local policy."
Although the opinion by Justice Tobriner does not cite Leflar, "5
48. Id. at 699, 376 N.E.2d at 915, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 442. The authoritative value of this
statement is considerably diminished by the court's application of New York law despite
the fact that the accident happened in Pennsylvania. Still, lower New York courts feel
bound by it. See Himes v. Stalker, 416 N.Y.S.2d 986 (1979); Rakaric v. The Croatian Club,
182 N.Y.L.J. 13 (Sept. 14, 1979). But cf. Manfredonia v. American Airlines, - App.
Div. 2d -, 416 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1979).
49. For earlier misspellings see Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 129, 130, 132,
286 N.E.2d 454, 458, 459, 460, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64, 71, 73, 74 (1972); Tooker v. Lopez, 24
N.Y.2d 569, 576, 578, 586, 587, 595, 249 N.E.2d 394, 395, 398, 400, 404, 405, 410, 301
N.Y.S.2d 519, 524, 527, 533, 534, 541 (1969) ("lex loci delictus").
50. 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969).
51. See Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215
(1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1977). This peculiar California brand of interest analy-
sis has recently withstood a constitutional challenge. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410
(1978). Concerning the comparative impairment doctrine, see Baxter, Choice of Law and
the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1963); Horowitz, The Law of Choice of Law in
California-A Restatement, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 719, 723, 748-58 (1974).
52. See Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 320-21, 546 P.2d 719, 723-24, 128
Cal. Rptr. 215, 219-20 (1977).
53. 22 Cal. 3d 157, 583 P.2d 721, 148 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978).
* 54. Id. at 168, 583 P.2d at 728, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 874.
55. The opinion does cite, however, the brilliant article by Paul Freund which antici-
pated almost every conflicts thought currently discussed, including the better-law idea.
See Freund, supra note 2, at 1214-16, 1224.
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it breathes his spirit and follows his teachings: for once the better
sister-state law was applied with the result that a nonresident
foreign defendant prevailed against a local plaintiff."
As Offshore Rental and numerous other cases indicate, Leflar
qualifies as an oracle of conflicts law also in the sense that his
writings have a markedly high predictive value. It is easy to see
why. Like good judges anywhere he uses commonsense as his
guide. When I say commonsense I do not mean mere visceral
reactions, but a sound instinct for what is right and what is
wrong, honed by experience and reflection as well as by meticu-
lous effort. Of course, it helps if one is able to bring to bear the
accumulated insights of a rich and wide-ranging career as a pro-
fessor of law and jurisprudence, a prolific author, a former state
supreme court justice, a teacher of appellate judges, and as some-
one concerned with law reform throughout his professional life. A
career of such distinction is bound to develop a perspective that
enables one to see the trees as well as the forest.
Leflar's conflicts philosophy, it seems to me, is quite simple
although by no means simplistic. One of tonight's panelists, Pro-
fessor Rosenberg, described its essence well when he remarked
that the conflicts "game is not played so [scholars] can flex their
jurisprudential muscles, but in order to better the human condi-
tion through law."57 That philosophy has a tradition which dates
back to the very beginnings of our discipline, but it needs some-
one like Leflar in times when there seems to be no more to con-
flicts law than the sound and fury of ever-changing fads.
56. Thus the true "governmental interests ...were those of a justice-dispensing
court in a modern American state, a repository of justice not only for the benefit of home-
state domiciliaries but for all litigants who come before the court, even residents of distant
states, and even as against local persons." Leflar, supra note 20, at 19.
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